Influence of Corporate Attributes on Forward-looking Information Disclosure in Publicly Traded Turkish Corporations  by Uyar, Ali & Kilic, Merve
 Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  62 ( 2012 )  244 – 252 
1877-0428 © 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer review under responsibility of Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Arasli
doi: 10.1016/j.sbspro.2012.09.039 
WCBEM 2012 
Influence of corporate attributes on forward-looking information 
disclosure in publicly traded Turkish corporations 
Ali Uyar a *, Merve Kilic b 
aFaculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Fatih University, 34500, Turkey 
bFaculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Fatih University, 34500, Turkey 
 
Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to determine the extent of forward-looking information disclosure in publicly traded Turkish 
corporations, and to identify drivers of disclosure. Through content analysis of annual reports, we identified the level of forward-
looking information disclosure in Turkish listed manufacturing companies. According to the results, forward-looking disclosure 
level is not high among Turkish companies currently; the majority of the disclosures are qualitative; and while all firms spread 
good news, no one discloses the bad ones. Furthermore, the results indicate that firm size and auditor size are the significant 
variables in explaining forward-looking information disclosure level; other five variables (i.e. profitability, leverage, ownership 
structure, independent directors, listing age) are insignificant. 
Keywords: Firm characteristics, forward-looking information, disclosure, Turkey 
1. Introduction 
Forward-looking information disclosure refers to providing information which enables stakeholders to evaluate 
future performance of a company. Such forward-looking disclosure might involve both financial forecasts such as 
-financial information such as risks and 
uncertainties that are likely to affect performance of the firm (Aljifri and Hussainey, 2007). 
Disclosing forward-looking information, as is the case in other information disclosure fields, reduces information 
asymmetry between firms and stakeholders. It plays a role in closing the information gap between the two parties, 
thus permitting stakeholders to make healthier decisions about companies. Besides backward-looking information 
which is largely provided by financial statements and narrative sections of annual reports, stakeholders want to 
know what projections firm managers make for the future operations. Especially, investors need such information in 
making buying or selling decisions about shares of a given firm. They are willing to invest in companies which 
promise high future performance. The only way of letting investors learn such possibilities is to present forward-
looking information through communication channels such as annual reports, corporate web sites, and press 
releases. Creditors also need forward-looking information for decision-making related to loan provision. Creditors 
want as much information as they can gather if they are to provide loans to the firms. In addition, they want to be 
sure that the loans will be paid back. Hence, forward-looking information, along with backward-looking, meets 
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more information needs of creditors. Guidelines of various accounting institutions (i.e. American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants and Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants) suggest the inclusion of forward-
looking information and disclosure of anticipated risks for information reporting framework (Beretta and Bozzolon, 
2004). In a recently promulgated regulation in 2011, Capital Markets Board in Turkey requires firms to disclose 
forward-looking information in relation to several performance measures (CMB, 2011). 
There are several motivations for the present study. Although there is a growing body of research on disclosure 
practices of firms, many of the studies have been conducted in developed countries. Aljifri and Hussainey (2007) 
point out the scarcity of studies that have investigated disclosure of forward-looking information in developing 
countries, this observation also holds true for Turkey which is an important developing country with its rapidly 
growing economy. In addition, the subject has not been studied as much as other areas of information disclosure, 
such as social, environmental, and intellectual capital. Furthermore, sufficient knowledge is lacking with respect to 
the factors that influence forward-looking disclosure. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: The next section provides literature review. Third section 
develops the hypotheses. Data and methodology are explained in the fourth section. Section five analyzes the 
results. Finally, section six concludes the paper, explains limitations, and makes recommendations for further 
research. 
2. Literature review 
Forward-looking information has been provided under various sub- -
-looking 
information as a subset of strategic information directed at invest
provide high quality disclosures, include forward-looking information in their reports. Despite its importance for 
various stakeholders, this kind of information has, comparably, less or the least disclosure rate among other 
disclosure areas (Patelli and Prencipe, 2007; Elsayed and Hoque, 2010). 
Analysts tend to rely more heavily on forward-looking non-financial information than on backward-looking non-
nformation users need and demand forward-looking information 
beyond current earnings and book value that helps them project future performance (Morton and Neill, 2001). 
(Broberg et al., 2009). 
Earlier studies found that firms tend to disclose qualitative rather than quantitative forward-looking information 
(Kent and Ung, 2003). Two factors might be causing this tendency: to avoid litigation costs arising from wrong 
projec
-looking disclosure. 
Moreover, previous researchers mention the existence of good news bias (tendency for disclosing good news, but 
not bad news) in forward-looking disclosures (Clarkson et al., 1994). 
There are several studies which examined possible factors that drive forward-looking disclosure in various 
countries. Vanstraelen et al. (2003) conducted a study in three continental European countries (i.e. Belgium, 
Germany and the Netherlands), and found that country and size has significant influence on forward-looking 
disclosure. Aljifri and Hussainey (2007) investigated the determinants of forward-looking information disclosure in 
the United Arab Emirates. They found that profitability (negative coefficient) and debt ratio (positive coefficient) 
are associated with disclosure level, whereas auditor size, firm size, and sector type are not. Kent and Ung (2003) 
tested the influence of four factors (i.e. competition, external financing, earnings volatility, and auditor quality) and 
firm size (control variable) on the decision of Australian firms regarding disclosure of forward-looking information. 
They determined that earnings volatility and firm size are associated with forward-looking disclosure, while other 
factors are not. 
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3. Hypotheses 
3.1. Firm size 
Since larger firms are more exposed to public scrutiny than smaller firms, they tend to disclose more information 
(Alsaeed, 2006). Furthermore, information disclosures may be used to decrease agency costs, to reduce information 
asymmetries between the company and the providers of funds, and to reduce political costs (Inchausti, 1997). 
Although Aljifri and Hussainey (2007) did not find significant association between firm size and the level of 
the existence of significant positive association between the two variables. Thus, the hypothesis has been developed 
as: 
H1: There is a positive relationship between firm size (as measured by sales revenues) and the level of forward-
looking information disclosure. 
3.2. Profitability 
According to signalling theory, companies will be more inclined to signal their quality to investors when 
company performance is good (Inchausti, 1997, Watson et al., 2002). In addition, management of a profitable firm 
may wish to disclose more information to the public to promote a positive impression (Alsaeed, 2006). This leads to 
the following hypothesis: 
H2: There is a positive relationship between profitability (as measured by return on equity) and the level of 
forward-looking information disclosure. 
3.3. Leverage 
Firms which have higher debt in their capital structure are prone to higher agency cost (Alsaeed, 2006). 
Information disclosure may be used to avoid agency costs and to reduce information asymmetries (Inchausti, 1997). 
Therefore, it is argued that leveraged firms have to disclose more information to satisfy information needs of the 
creditors (Uyar and Kilic, 2012). Hence, the following hypothesis was formulated: 
H3: There is a positive relationship between leverage (as measured by the ratio of total liabilities to total assets) 
and the level of forward-looking information disclosure. 
3.4. Auditor size 
Big-
practices (Wallace et al., 1994). They might use the information disclosed by their clients as a means of signalling 
their own quality as well (Inchausti, 1997). Hence, clients of Big-4 audit firms are expected to disclose higher levels 
of information. Thus, the following hypothesis has been developed: 
H4: There is a positive relationship between auditor size and the level of forward-looking information disclosure. 
3.5. Ownership diffusion 
Malone et al. (1993) point out that as the number of shareholders increases, level of disclosure is expected to 
increase. Morevoer, Raffournier (1995) argues that agency relations may play a major role in the disclosure policy 
of companies because annual reports can be used to reduce monitoring costs. Hence, he believes that managers of 
firms with diffuse ownership are motivated to disclose more information to help shareholders monitor their 
behavior. Thus, the following is hypothesized: 
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H5 d-looking 
information disclosure. 
3.6. Independent directors 
Inclusion of outside directors on the board might enhance the viability of the board as an internal control 
mechanism (Fama, 1980), prevent expropriation of security holder wealth (Fama, 1980), attenuate agency costs 
(Forker, 1992), and create pressure for better disclosure (Forker, 1992). If independent directors on the board 
actually perform their controlling and monitoring role, disclosure quality is improved (Forker, 1992), and more 
information disclosure is expected (Eng and Mak, 2003; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Contrary to expectations, Patelli 
and Prencipe (2007) could not find significant association between the proportion of independent directors and 
forward-looking information disclosure; however, Lim et al. (2007) found. Thus, the following is hypothesized: 
H6: There is a positive association between proportion of independent directors on the board and the level of 
forward-looking information disclosure. 
3.7. Listing age 
Owusu-Ansah (1998, p. 614) states the following three factors for higher disclosure level of older firms: younger 
companies may suffer competitive disadvantage; gathering, processing and disseminating information may be more 
costly for younger firms; younger companies may l
Thus, the following hypothesis has been developed: 
H7: There is a positive relationship between listing age and the level of forward-looking information disclosure. 
4. Methodology 
Parallel 
main source of documentation which provides timely information to the stakeholders on a regular basis. Data was 
collected by analyzing narrative sections of annual reports of manufacturing companies listed on the Istanbul Stock 
Exchange (ISE) for the year 2010. Total number of available annual reports was 131 out of 138 manufacturing 
companies.  
Content analysis method, which has been used to measure the extent of forward-looking disclosure level of firms 
in many previous studies, was utilized in this study as well. Content analysis is conducted by codifying information 
pieces to measure the extent of disclosure. In content analysis methodology, the units of measurement are word, 
sentence, paragraph, page proportion, or clause/phrase, and each unit of analysis has its own pros and cons 
(Campbell and Abdul Rahman, 2010). However, some previous studies have used disclosure index approach based 
on the pres
approach by assigning a value of 1 in case an item of forward-looking information is disclosed and 0 if it is not. The 





 dj=1 if the item j is disclosed 
0 if the item j is not disclosed 
 n=number of items 
Disclosure list of forward-looking information includes the most frequently used items for future projections in 
earlier studies as seen in Table 1 (Broberg et al., 2009; Patelli and Prencipe, 2007; Eng and Mak, 2003; Lim et al., 
2007; Lopes and De Alencar, 2010; Depoers and Jeanjean, 2010; Chau and Gray, 2010; Elsayed and Hoque, 2010). 
Table 1 also shows the disclosure level of forward-looking items in annual reports. According to the results, new 
investments forecast is the most frequently disclosed item (mean=0.420), whereas share price estimation is the least 
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disclosed one (mean=0.015). Means of all items indicate that forward-looking disclosure level is not high at all 
among Turkish companies currently.  
Furthermore, we detected that the majority of the disclosures (78.4%) is qualitative; and the remaining (21.6%) 
is quantitative.  Another important finding is that all firms give good news, none discloses bad news. These findings 
have broad consistency with the findings in earlier studies. 
 
Table 1. Items of forward-looking information disclosure 
 Items Mean 
1 Profits/profitability forecast (quantitative & qualitative) 0.198 
2 Market share forecast (quantitative & qualitative) 0.237 
3 Sales forecast (quantitative & qualitative) 0.160 
4 Cash flow forecast (quantitative & qualitative) 0.023 
5 Capital expenditure forecast (quantitative & qualitative) 0.191 
6 New investments forecast (quantitative & qualitative) 0.420 
7 Share price estimation (quantitative & qualitative) 0.015 
 Overall average 0.178 
In order to investigate the association between the explanatory variables and forward-looking information 
disclosure level, we applied Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression which incorporates seven explanatory 
variables. Hence, the following model is established with explanations of variables: 
FWDSCOR= 0 1 SALES 2 ROE+ 3 LEVER+ 4 AUDIT+ 5 OWDIF+ 6 INDIR+ 7  
where: 
FWDSCOR total forward-looking items disclosed/maximum score for firm; 
SALES  total sales revenues; 
ROE  return on equity; 
LEVER  leverage as measured by total liabilities divided by total assets; 
AUDIT  dummy variable for audit firm size, coded as 1 for Big-4 and 0 otherwise; 
OWDIF  ownership diffusion (i.e. percentage of shares held by unknown shareholders); 
INDIR  proportion of independent directors on the board; 
LAGE  listing age 
5. Results and analyses 
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics for the variables are presented in Table 2. The average forward-looking information 
disclosure index is 17.80%, with a wide range of 0% to 100%. Thus, there is a large variety in information 
disclosure practices among the sample corporations. The average sales revenue is 1,015,119,239.79 TL (Turkish 
Liras). Although the majority of the firms are profitable, there are also unprofitable ones (30 firms). The average 
return on equity ratio is 3%. Furthermore, the average of audit firm size indicates that the majority of the firms are 
audited by Big-
is not diffused at all. On average, 5.00% of board members are independent directors. The 
end of 1985. 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for the independent variables (N=131, year 2010) 
  Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Forward-looking information disclosure index 0.000 1.000 0.178 0.207 
Sales (TL*) 4,090,310.00 26,165,954,000.00 1,015,119,239.79 2,937,426,045.47 
Return on equity -0.76 0.56 0.03 0.23 
Leverage 0.02 1.04 0.44 0.22 
Auditor size  0.00 1.00 0.61 0.49 
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% of shares held by unknown shareholders 0.49 95.07 35.02 20.41 
Independent directors 0.00 0.60 0.05 0.11 
Listing age 1.00 27.00 17.67 6.09 
* Turkish Liras 
5.2. Univariate analysis 
In order to investigate the association among dependent and independent variables, and check the existence of 
multicollinearity, we conducted the Pearson correlation analysis. The results indicated that forward-looking 
information disclosure is significantly associated with firm size and auditor size. Table 3 presents the results of this 
analysis. Moreover, there is no multicollinearity among independent and dependent variables as 0.80 (Bryman and 
Cramer 2001) or 0.90 (Hair et al. 2009) is considered a threshold for multicollinearity problem. 
Table 3. Pearson correlation analysis 
 FWDSCOR SALES ROE LEVER AUDITOR OWDIF INDIR LAGE 
FWDSCOR 1 0.239** 0.106 -0.075 0.244** -0.149 -0.122 0.082 
SALES 0.239** 1 0.143 0.167 0.187* -0.076 0.028 0.024 
ROE 0.106 0.143 1 -0.470** 0.078 -0.131 0.037 0.079 
LEVER -0.075 0.167 -0.470** 1 -0.044 -0.059 -0.009 -0.024 
AUDITOR 0.244** 0.187* 0.078 -0.044 1 -0.287** -0.071 0.171 
OWDIF -0.149 -0.076 -0.131 -0.059 -0.287** 1 0.079 -0.178* 
INDIR -0.122 0.028 0.037 -0.009 -0.071 0.079 1 -0.251** 
LAGE 0.082 0.024 0.079 -0.024 0.171 -0.178* -0.251** 1 
*Significant at the 0.05 level; **Significant at the 0.01 level. 
FWDSCOR total items disclosed/maximum score for firm; 
SALES  total sales revenues; 
ROE  return on equity; 
LEVER  leverage as measured by total liabilities divided by total assets; 
AUDIT  dummy variable for audit firm size, coded as 1 for Big-4 and 0 otherwise; 
OWDIF  ownership diffusion (i.e. percentage of shares held by unknown shareholders); 
INDIR  proportion of independent directors on the board; 
LAGE  listing age 
5.3. Multivariate analysis 
Results of the OLS regression in Table 4 show that F-ratio is 2.584 (p = 0.05). Hence, the model is statistically 
significant and adjusted R2 is 0.079 which implies that explanatory variables explain 7.9 percent of the variance in 
forward-looking information disclosure level. VIF values under 10 indicate absence of multicollinearity (Naser et 
al., 2006). 
Table 4. OLS regression results 
Variable Coef. t VIF
(Constant) 0.200 2.291 1.142 
SALES 1.570E-11 2.481** 1.422 
ROE 0.002 0.022 1.419 
LEVER -0.102 -1.098 1.154 
AUDITOR 0.070 1.829* 1.150 
OWDIF -0.001 -0.904 1.075 
INDIR -0.202 -1.260 1.117 
LAGE 0.000 0.045 1.142 
Adjusted R2 = 0.079 
   
F-ratio = 2.584     
p = 0.05    
* Significant at 0.10 level; ** Significant at 0.05 level 
Findings indicate that firm size, as measured by sales revenues, has significant positive association with forward-
looking information disclosure level (0.05 level). This means that the larger the firm, the more forward-looking 
250   Ali Uyar and Merve Kilic /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  62 ( 2012 )  244 – 252 
information it discloses. Thus, H1 is accepted. The finding is parallel to the findings of earlier studies (Vanstraelen 
 
Furthermore, auditor size has significant positive association with forward-looking information disclosure level 
(at 0.10 level). This means that firms which are audited by Big-4 auditing firms disclose more forward-looking 
information in their annual reports than others. Hence, H4 is accepted, contrary to Kent and Ung (2003), and Aljifri 
and Hussainey (2007). 
Other variables such as profitability, leverage, ownership structure, independent directors, listing age have no 
significant association with forward-looking information disclosure level of firms. Hence, H2, H3, H5, H6, and H7 
are rejected. 
6. Conclusion 
The present study extends previous research on the determinants of forward-looking information disclosure in 
two respects. First, contrary to many earlier studies conducted in developed countries, this study investigates the 
forward-looking information disclosure practices of firms in Turkey which is an important developing country. 
Secondly, this study utilized a comprehensive set of variables and tested seven hypotheses to provide evidence 
regarding forward-looking information disclosure practices of Turkish firms. The study provides empirical evidence 
in relation to the impact of these variables on the information disclosure level. 
According to the results, new investment forecast is the most frequently disclosed item, whereas share price 
estimation is the least disclosed one. Means of all items indicate that forward-looking disclosure level is not high 
among Turkish companies currently. This low disclosure level might be attributed to pessimism in future 
expectations, unwillingness to disclose too much information which might weaken competitive position in the 
marketplace, litigation costs due to wrong projections, and some other reasons. Furthermore, we detected that the 
majority of the disclosures are qualitative. Another important finding is that all firms give good news, none discloses 
bad news.  
The findings also show that firm size is an important determinant of forward-looking information disclosure; 
larger firms tend to disclose more information than smaller ones. Auditor size is another significant determinant. 
Thus, firms which are audited by Big-4 auditing firms are likely to present more information than the others in 
annual reports. Other five variables (i.e. profitability, leverage, ownership structure, independent directors, listing 
age) are found insignificant.  
Furthermore, the present study has some implications for corporations. According to the finding of a research 
study, forward-
2006). Hence, we can say that analysts attribute great importance to forward-looking information, and put forward 
th
behave in accordance with the knowledge that investors take their positions primarily on the basis of future 
expectations. Moreover, disclosure practices of corporations could be improved by initiatives of regulatory bodies 
and auditing firms (Uyar, 2009;  
The study was conducted solely on manufacturing companies; the results may not be generalizable for other 
industries such as service and merchandising industries. Secondly, the study is based on data for the year 2010. 
Further longitudinal studies might be conducted to investigate disclosure patterns of companies across years. 
Thirdly, this study used only the annual reports of firms as the information disclosure source; other sources such as 
web sites, press releases, and prospectuses were not utilized. Finally, the list of forward-looking information 
disclosure is not a static list; hence, it can be broadened and enlarged in future studies. 
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